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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new framework for analyzing inequality that moves beyond the anonymity
postulate. We estimate the determinants of sectoral choice and the joint distributions of outcomes
across  sectors.  We  determine  which  components  of  realized  earnings  variability  are  due  to
uncertainty and which components are due to components of human diversity that are forcastable
by agents. Using our tools, we can determine how policies shift persons across sectors and outcome
distributions across sectors.
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Most studies of income inequality and social mobility are descriptive in nature. Studies of inequality
compare di®erences in the location in the overall distribution of income among groups at a point in time
and over time and the evolution of income distributions within groups over time. Studies of mobility
measure movements of income within lifetimes or across generations.1 These exercises present factual
summaries of income inequality and income mobility.
For the purposes of policy analysis, and for interpreting facts within a scienti¯c model, it is necessary to
move beyond factual description to construct counterfactuals. They can be used to determine what would
happen to mobility or inequality if di®erent policies or interventions were tried than the policies historically
observed. They can also be used to decompose observed inequality and mobility into components due to
genuine uncertainty (\luck" as described by Jencks, Smith, Acland, Bane, Cohen, Gintis, Heyns, and
Michelson, 1972) and components of heterogeneity and individual di®erences that are predictable, at least
by a certain age or stage of the life cycle.
This paper describes recent methodological advances that enable analysts to construct counterfactual
distributions and separate heterogeneity (predictable variability across persons) from uncertainty.2 In gen-
eral, the welfare consequences of predictable heterogeneity and unpredictable uncertainty are not the same.
Using the tools reviewed here, analysts can determine how much inequality and mobility is forecastable at
a given age and how much is due to unforecastable luck.
These methods allow analysts to move beyond aggregate summary measures of inequality that are
based on the anonymity postulate to determine which groups in an initial distribution are a®ected by a
policy change and how they are a®ected. The anonymity postulate treats two aggregate distributions as
equally good if, after income is redistributed among persons, the overall distribution is the same. With our
methods we can determine, for reforms that are contemplated but have never been implemented, which
groups in an initial position bene¯t or lose, how much they lose, how they would vote in advance of a
reform and how they would vote after it is implemented, once the ex ante uncertainty surrounding the
outcomes of the reform is resolved.
1See Fields (2003) for a comparison of inequality and mobility measures.
2We draw on results reported in Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (1999, 2005); Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003);
Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005); Heckman (1992); Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), and Heckman, Lochner, and
Todd (2006).
1We can move beyond aggregate summary measures of policy outcomes to gauge the e®ects of a policy
on subgroups de¯ned by unobserved potential outcomes within the overall population distribution. Thus
we can move beyond traditional inequality and social mobility analyses to consider how a policy shifts
persons from a position in one potential outcome distribution to another even though joint potential out-
come distributions cannot be directly measured, but must be derived from marginal outcome distributions
for program participants and nonparticipants. Conventional studies of inequality consider movements of
persons among observed (measured) states (see, e.g., Ravallion, 2003).
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present a choice-theoretic framework for
constructing counterfactuals and we consider limitations of our approach. Section 3 presents our method
for constructing distributions of counterfactuals based on factor models, extending methods developed by
JÄ oreskog and Goldberger (1975) and JÄ oreskog (1977) to consider the construction of counterfactuals. We
illustrate results on identi¯cation derived in a number of previous papers by focusing on a simple parametric
version of the model. Section 4 shows how we can use information about choices and subsequent realizations
to infer how much agents know about future earnings when making their choices about college. This section
reviews a method for estimating \luck" and separating it from predictable heterogeneity that is developed
in Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005). Section 6 concludes.
2 The Evaluation of Social Programs: Choices Within Policy
States and Comparisons Across Policy States
Social programs such as job training and college tuition subsidies are central features of the modern welfare
state. Because di®erent parties may gain or lose from such programs, there is a demand for knowledge about
the redistributive e®ects of government policies. The central problem in the literature on the evaluation
of social policies is the construction of counterfactuals.
In the simplest form of the evaluation problem, there are two possible choices: agents may receive a
treatment or not. We denote by S = 1 the agents who receive the treatment and by S = 0 those who
don't. To ¯x ideas, consider the case in which S = 0 denotes a worker who chooses to be a high school
graduate, and S = 1 a worker who chooses to be a college graduate. The treatment is college education.
2Associated with each level of education is a potential outcome. Let (Y0;Y1) denote potential outcomes
in schooling level S = 0 and S = 1; respectively. The outcomes Y0 and Y1 can be expressed in monetary
or utility units, but in the discussion that follows we shall think of the rewards as earnings in each sector
expressed in dollars. Each person has a (Y0;Y1) pair. The gain for an individual who moves from S = 0 to
S = 1 is ¢; where ¢ ´ Y1 ¡ Y0:
If Y1 and Y0 could be observed for each individual at the same time, the gain ¢ would be known for each
person. An evaluation problem arises because we do not observe the pair (Y0;Y1) for anybody. This is a
missing data problem: in calculating the gains to attending college for a particular individual who chooses
to be a college graduate, we observe her college earnings (Y1), but not her high school earnings (Y0). We
can solve this missing data problem by constructing counterfactuals: how much a college graduate would
earn if she had chosen to be a high school graduate. To identify these counterfactuals, di®erent approaches
in the literature of program evaluation make di®erent assumptions about how the missing data are related
to the available data, and what data are available.
One possible approach is to model the decision making of the individuals. The choices made by
agents depend on their perception of outcomes Y0 and Y1: The choices may also be in°uenced by the costs
associated with schooling, C. These costs C may arise because of pecuniary (e.g., tuition), or nonpecuniary
reasons (e.g, heterogeneity in preferences for schooling), but if we assume that costs C can be expressed
in monetary units, it is straightforward to de¯ne the net utility I as:
I = Y1 ¡ Y0 ¡ C (1)
If agents maximize their utility index I, they attend college if, and only if, they gain from it. This is
represented by the following decision rule:
S = 1 if I ¸ 0; S = 0 otherwise. (2)
It is possible to consider alternative decision rules by embedding this model into a dynamic environment,
analyzing di®erent credit market structures, uncertainty, risk aversion, and so on. (See e.g. Heckman and
Navarro, 2006). However, for expositional ease we focus on the simple decision rule generated by (1) and
3(2) since it is su±ciently rich to serve our purposes.3
Assume that (Y0;Y1) have ¯nite means and can be expressed in terms of explanatory variables X in
the following manner:
Y0 = X¯0 + U0; (3)
Y1 = X¯1 + U1; (4)
where E (Y0 j X) = ¹0 (X), E (Y1 j X) = ¹1 (X) and E (U0 j X) = E (U1 j X) = 0.
Further, assume that costs C can be expressed in terms of explanatory variables Z and unobservables
UC:
C = Z° + UC: (5)
The model described by equations (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) is the Generalized Roy model. If costs are
identically zero for all agents, so that C = ¹C(Z) = UC = 0, equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) describe the
simple Roy model as developed in Roy (1951).
Traditionally, the literature on program evaluation has focused on estimating mean impacts of S and
not distributions. The most commonly studied parameter in the literature is the average treatment e®ect:
ATE(X) = E (¢jX) = E (Y1 ¡ Y0jX): (6)
Another popular parameter is the e®ect of treatment on the treated,
TT(X;Z) = E (¢ j X;S = 1) = E (Y1 ¡ Y0 j X;S = 1): (7)
The evaluation of policies has traditionally focused on such mean e®ects. Nevertheless, the gains ¢
are heterogenous across agents even after one controls for X. As a result, mean gains are not necessarily
the most interesting parameter to be estimated. Consider an example from the economics of education:
we want to evaluate a policy that reduces tuition by one thousand dollars. The marginal cost of such a
policy is, therefore, constant. If gains are heterogenous across people, we need to know (a) how many
3See Heckman (2001) for a survey of this literature. These models for counterfactuals and potential outcomes are called
Roy (1951) or Generalized Roy models and have an ancient lineage in econometrics. The decision-maker may be a parent,
and the outcomes may be for a child.
4entrants into education will be induced by the tuition policy, and (b) from where in the distribution of
gains to schooling (¢) the new entrants are coming. In this example, it would be optimal to keep o®ering
tuition reductions up to the point that the marginal gain is equal to the marginal cost. If we compute
(b), we can monitor the marginal gain as we vary the size of the policy. If we can compute (a) and (b),
we can calculate the aggregate gains from the tuition policy. Consequently, if the gains ¢ vary across
agents, no single number summarizes the distribution of gains for all purposes of policy evaluation. For
each speci¯c policy question we want to address, we must carefully de¯ne the parameter of interest (see
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005, 2007a,b). In general, the average gain of those who are in the program is
not the relevant parameter of interest. For other problems of distributional analysis, it is of interest to
determine where in an initial distribution bene¯ciaries come from and where they end up in the treatment
outcome distribution.
If we want to recognize the fact the gains are heterogenous across people we raise an econometric
di±culty. Once we have de¯ned the parameter of interest, say the gain to the marginal entrant, how
can we estimate it? If we wish to avoid special assumptions like statistical independence between Y0 and
Y1 or perfect dependence, the solution is to recover the joint distribution of (Y0;Y1): Once we know this
distribution, it is possible to calculate the distribution of (Y1 ¡ Y0) for any group of people we are interested
in and obtain its median or any other quantile.
In this paper, we report on recent research that solves the problem of constructing counterfactuals
by identifying the joint distribution of (Y1;Y0) and the potential outcomes under some policy regime,
conditional on S (or I), using a factor structure model. These models generalize the LISREL models
of JÄ oreskog (1977) and the MIMIC model of JÄ oreskog and Goldberger (1975) to produce counterfactual
distributions.






for outcomes and costs
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under policy regime A through price and quality e®ects and
(b) those that a®ect sectorial choices (through CA), but do not a®ect potential outcomes. Tuition and
educational access policies that do not produce general equilibrium e®ects fall into the second category of
policy. It is the second kind of policy that receives the most attention in empirical work on the economics







51999) or evaluating schooling policies (e.g., Kane, 1994).4
Consider two general policy environments denoted A and B: These policies might a®ect the costs of











each person. There might be general equilibrium policies or policies that operate in the presence of social
interactions that a®ect both costs and outcomes.5
A special case of this policy produces two social states for outcomes that we wish to compare. However,







for each person. They a®ect costs and the choice of outcomes,
but not the potential outcomes as a full-°edged general equilibrium or social interaction analysis would
do. We focus most of our attention on policies that keep potential schooling outcomes unchanged but that
vary C in selecting who takes schooling.
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within policy regime B, and (b) aggregate income across policy regimes
¡
Y A;Y B¢
where Y A = Y A
1 SA +
Y A
0 (1 ¡ SA) is the observed income under regime A and Y B = Y B
1 SB + Y B
0 (1 ¡ SB) is the income under
regime B; where SA = 1 if a person chose S = 1 under regime A and SB is de¯ned in an analogous fashion.
The tradition in the analysis of income inequality is to make comparisons across regimes i.e., to compare
the distribution of Y A = Y A
1 SA + Y A
0 (1 ¡ SA) with the distribution of Y B = Y B
1 SB + Y B
0 (1 ¡ SB): When
both A and B are observed, such comparisons are straightforward if there are panel data on incomes of
the same persons in both states.









each policy regime and can also construct comparisons across policy states based on Y A
1 SA + Y A
0 (1 ¡ SA)
and Y B
1 SB + Y B
0 (1 ¡ SB): We can also compare movements from Y A
0 to Y B
1 as well as other comparisons
whether or not A and B are observed. This allows us to obtain a much richer understanding of the
inequality and social mobility consequences of policy change than are available from inequality measures
based on the anonymity axiom, and allows us to go more deeply than panel data analyses that compare
movements from the distribution of Y A to the distribution of Y B: We can use our analysis to generate
counterfactual states, never measured. We now present our methodology.
4Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998b,c, 1999) develop general equilibrium policy analysis computing distributional
consequences of alternative policies. See also Bourguignon and da Silva (2003).
5Thus a large scale expansion of the educational system may depress the returns to schooling.
63 Identifying counterfactual distributions using factor models
The Roy model (1951) postulates that individuals choose the option that gives them the highest outcome.
There are no costs associated with receipt or nonreceipt of treatment. The nonparametric identi¯cation of
the joint distribution of outcomes is established in Heckman and Honor¶ e (1990). Consider, for example,
the case in which the error terms U0;U1 are normally distributed. In this case sectoral outcomes are
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We observe Y0 or Y1 for each person but not the pair (Y0;Y1). The trick is to show that one can identify
Cov (Y0;Y1). If we observe I in equation (1) where C = 0, then we could compute the Cov (Y1;I) and,
consequently, identify Cov (Y0;Y1) because from the de¯nition of I and a property of covariances it follows
that:
Cov (Y1;I) = Cov (Y1;Y1 ¡ Y0) = V ar(Y1) ¡ Cov (Y1;Y0): (9)
Obviously, we don't observe I directly, but we do observe choices, and we know that S = 1 , I ¸ 0 and
have I up to scale ¾Y1¡Y0 = [V ar(Y1 ¡ Y0)]






















Since we can obtain V ar(Y1) and V ar(Y0), subtracting the second term from the ¯rst term we obtain
¾Y1¡Y0 =
















. Hence we can identify Cov (Y1;Y0) and ¾y1¡y0.
The Roy model makes two strong assumptions. First, agents can choose sectors without incurring any
costs. In a schooling model it is natural to allow for both pecuniary costs (such as tuition) as well as
nonpecuniary costs (e.g., di®erences in preferences for education). Second, the model does not allow for
uncertainty in future rewards. In the schooling model example, agents are assumed to keep working in
the same sector for many periods. They are assumed to have full information on the future evolution of
demand and supply of skills at the time they are making their educational decisions. Below we will show
how we can extend the simple Roy model to allow for uncertainty and costs, and how we can generate
restrictions to test and identify the information set of the agent at the time he makes sectoral choices.
The Generalized Roy model We introduce extensions of the Roy model one step at a time. We
start by introducing participation costs, but postpone our discussion of uncertainty to the next section.
Let C denote the cost of participation in sector \1". We may not observe C directly, because it may
be partially determined by heterogeneity in agent preferences. This is the Generalized Roy model which
was developed by Heckman (1976) and used by Willis and Rosen (1979). Allowing for direct costs for
participation in sector \1" a®ects the identi¯cation of the joint distribution of rewards. As shown by
Heckman and Honor¶ e (1990), given data on X;Z;S and Y = SY1+(1 ¡ S)Y0, one cannot recover the joint
distribution F (Y0;Y1): The problem is that if costs are not observed, choices alone do not provide enough
information to identify the covariance between outcomes Y0 and Y1: We can immediately see why if we
consider the case in which I is observed. In the generalized Roy model, I = Y1 ¡ Y0 ¡ C: Consequently:
Cov (Y1;Y0) + Cov (Y1;C) = Cov (I;Y1) ¡ V ar(Y1) (10)
We have two unknowns in one equation. If we use the information on Cov (I;Y0) it is still not enough to
identify the model because we pick up a new term: Cov (Y0;C). The problem worsens when we account for
the fact that I is observed only up to scale. As a result, without further assumptions, the Generalized Roy
model is underidenti¯ed. Before presenting these assumptions, we embed the Roy model in an uncertain
environment.
8The Generalized Roy model in an Uncertain Economy We now introduce uncertainty in the
generalized Roy model. We still assume a one-period economy in which agents are uncertain about the
rewards at the time they are making their choices. The timing in this economy is as follows: At the
beginning of the period, agents have an information set I, whose elements may be unobserved by the
analyst although they are known by the individual. Given this information set, agents make the decision
about working in sector \0" or \1". After the decision is made, all uncertainty is revealed and agents
observe their earnings. In this economy with uncertainty we rewrite the index I as:
I = E (Y1 ¡ Y0 ¡ CjI):
The decision rule becomes:
S = 1 if I ¸ 0; S = 0 otherwise. (11)
The decision rule (11) states the agents choose sector 1 if, and only if, the expected net gains are positive.
We are assuming linear utility, implying that agents are risk neutral. More general models with respect to
risk aversion can be identi¯ed (see the discussion in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005 and the review in
Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006), but we focus on the case of linear utility for the sake of simplicity. If
we assume that X;Z;UC 2 I we can rewrite the index I in terms of explanatory and unobserved variables
as:
I = X (¯1 ¡ ¯0) ¡ Z° + E (U1 ¡ U0 ¡ UCjI):
For the uncertain economy, the mean earnings for those who work in sector \1" is:
E [Y1 j X;Z;I ¸ 0] = X¯1 + E [U1 j X;Z;E (U1 ¡ U0 ¡ UCjI) ¸ ¡X (¯1 ¡ ¯0) + Z°]: (12)
To proceed further we need to put more structure on the problem. In particular, we need to separate two
distinct unobservable components. The ¯rst is the unobserved component (from the point of view of the
analyst) that is known and acted on by the individual. This is the component captured by the expectation
term E (U1 ¡ U0 ¡ UCjI): If this term changes, it will change the utility index I and expected earnings
at the same time. The second term is unobserved by the analyst and unknown by the individual. It is
9captured by Us ¡E (UsjI) for s = 0;1: It does not a®ect schooling choices, but it a®ects realized earnings
because we can always rewrite equation (8) as
Ys = X¯s + E (UsjI) + fUs ¡ E (UsjI)g
From equation (12), there is selection on E (Us j I) but not on Us¡E (Us j I). We name the ¯rst component
\heterogeneity" and the second \uncertainty". The recent work of Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003)
and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) develop models in which it is possible to identify and separate
heterogeneity from uncertainty.
The key idea underlying their work is to impose a factor structure on the error terms of outcome and
choice equations. We decompose the unobservable error terms as:
U0 = ®0µ + "0; U1 = ®1µ + "1; and UC = ®Cµ + "C:
To ¯x ideas assume that the terms "0;"1 and "C are independent normal random variables:
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The error terms in outcomes, "0;"1; are a source of uncertainty in future outcomes, so we impose "0;"1 = 2 I.
Because agents must face the direct costs of choosing sector S = 1 at the time of their choice, it is natural
to assume that agents know the realization of cost shocks at the time of choice S, so that "C 2 I.
All of the dependence among U0;U1; and UC is captured through the factor µ: The factor µ is independent
from "0;"1; "C;X and Z: For simplicity, we assume that µ » N (0;¾2
µ); but this assumption can be relaxed6.
Because of the loadings ®0;®1 and ®C; the factor µ can a®ect U0;U1; and UC di®erently, so by adopting
the factor structure we are not imposing the sign of the covariance between U0;U1 and UC: For example,
it is possible that ®0 > 0 while ®1 · 0:
6In this paper we use the normality assumption because it is familiar, easily exposited, and easy to grasp the sources
of identi¯cation. Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) establish that the
distributions of "0;"1;"C and the factor µ can be nonparametrically identi¯ed.
10We do not need to assume µ 2 I. We can test whether µ 2 I or µ = 2 I under conditions we specify in
this paper. That is, we can test whether the agent knows (and acts on) information contained in µ that is
not observed by the analyst. Using this test we can decompose the residuals of outcome equations between
heterogeneity and luck (or uncertainty).
When the Generalized Roy model in the uncertain economy is analyzed using the factor structure
proposed by Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), the joint distribution of the rewards Y0;Y1 conditional






































Therefore, in this simple normal linear formulation of Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), identi¯cation




µ: From the observed data and the factor structure it follows that:
E (Y1jX;S = 1) = X¯1 + ®1E [µjX;S = 1] + E ["1jX;S = 1] (13)
which is equivalent to7:
E (Y1jX;S = 1) = X¯1 + ®1













It is easy to derive a similar expression for mean observed earnings in sector \0":
E (Y0jX;S = 0) = X¯0 ¡ ®0






















´ : Taking the ratio of the last two terms allow us to identify the ratio
®1
®0:In factor analysis
7For the complete derivation see the "Derivation Appendix" on the website for this paper:
http://jenni.uchicago.edu/frame-ineq
11we always need a normalization in the factor loadings to set the scale, so we normalize ®0 = 1.8 This




´ : It is not helpful to look at the information from the
variance of observed earnings to identify ¾2
´;®C and ¾2
µ separately. To see why, consider the variance of
observed earnings in sector \1":
V ar(Y1 j X;S = 1) = ®
2
1V ar(µ j S = 1) + ¾
2
"1:
From the variance we acquire a new term that identify: ¾2
"1: Because of this fact, when it comes to
identifying the parameters related to the factors (such as ¾2
µ and ®0s), we have to restrict ourselves to
information from the covariances, and not from the variances.
If there are variables W that are elements of X but not of Z we can identify more parameters: To see
why, write:








































¾´ (from the choice equation). If we know ¾´ we can recover (®0 + ®C ¡ ®1)¾2
µ from the coe±cient
on the ¯nal term of the right hand side of (14) and (15). We cannot proceed any further because we know
neither ®C nor ¾2
µ: Note that knowledge of ¾2
µ is crucial for identi¯cation of the joint distribution F (Y0;Y1):
The entire dependence between Y0 and Y1 is through the factor µ.
As just demonstrated, adding uncertainty and imposing the factor structure is not enough to guarantee
identi¯cation of the joint distribution of rewards F (Y0;Y1): However, there is something we can say about
the pattern of dependence between Y0 and Y1. The covariance of Y0 and Y1 is:


































Then, if we de¯ne ~ ®0 = k®0; ~ ¾µ = ¾µ
k and ~ ®1 = k®1; for some k > 0; the parameters ~ ®0; ~ ®1 and ~ ¾µ generate the same
covariance matrix as the parameters ®0;®1 and ¾µ:
12We cannot directly compute this covariance, because we never observe the pair (Y0;Y1) at the same time.





µ. The terms ®2
0, and ¾2
µ are always nonnegative, while the term
®1
®0 is identi¯ed from equations (14)
and (15). Consequently, we know at least the sign of the covariance, so we are able to say, for example,
whether agents who choose to work in sector \0" would tend to have earnings above or below the mean in
sector \1", if they had chosen to work in sector \1".
There are two other advantages of using factor models as shown here. First, they provide a °exible
structure for adding information that can help to identify the joint distribution of rewards F (Y0;Y1):
Second, if we have observations on outcomes for more than one period, or if we have observations on more
than one outcome in one period, the factor model provides a parsimonious way to capture the dependence
across outcomes and between outcomes and choices. We now show how supplementing the basic model
just presented aids in identi¯cation.
Cross-section data with one measurement equation Sometimes the analyst observes proxies
for unobserved variables that a®ect both selection into states as well as outcomes in each sector. These are
part of the source of the correlation between choices and outcomes. Because this correlation is captured
by the factor, these proxies are potentially informative about the distribution of the factors. We introduce
these proxies to obtain identi¯cation of our model. In the schooling example, it is reasonable to assume that
unobserved ability a®ects the decision of how much education to obtain. It is also reasonable to assume
that higher ability individuals will have higher earnings (even after controlling for the ¯nal education level)
because higher ability makes an individual more productive. Suppose, that we have a set of test scores M
for each person. Suppose that the measurement M is made for all agents regardless of whether S = 1 or
S = 0, so that we do not have to worry about selection issues in the measurement. If we impose a linear
speci¯cation we obtain:
M = XM¯M + ®Mµ + "M (17)
where XM are observable explanatory variables orthogonal to the factor µ that help predict the measure-
ment. The variables XM need not be the same as the explanatory variables X which predict outcomes
Y0 and Y1: The disturbance "M is assumed to be normally distributed with E ("M) = 0; V ar("M) = ¾2
"M,
independent from µ and XM:
13The measurement M is observed for everyone regardless of the schooling choice. Because we do not
have to worry about selection problems in the measurement M; and because of the independence between
XM, µ; and "M; we can identify ¯M from a simple OLS regression of (17): Above, we have already shown
that by applying the Heckman two-step procedure to equations (14) and (15); we can identify ¯1 and ¯0:
The availability of the measurement M yields the computation of ¯ve more covariance equations:
Cov (Y0 ¡ X¯0;M ¡ XM¯M) = ®0®M¾
2
µ; (18)
Cov (Y1 ¡ X¯1;M ¡ XM¯M) = ®1®M¾
2
µ; (19)
Cov (I ¡ X¯1 + X¯0 + Z°;M ¡ XM¯M) = (®1 ¡ ®0 ¡ ®C)®M¾
2
µ (20)




Cov (I ¡ X¯1 + X¯0 + Z°;Y1 ¡ X¯1) = (®1 ¡ ®0 ¡ ®C)®1¾
2
µ (22)
Assume now that we make one normalization: ®M = 1 instead of normalizing ®0 = 1. By taking the ratio
of (22) to (20), we can identify ®1: Because ®M = 1; we can use (19) to solve for ¾2
µ; which we use in
(18) to identify ®0: The last term to be identi¯ed is ®C which we can recover from (20). Note that given
the normalization ®M = 1 we have four parameters (®0;®1;®C; and ¾2
µ) and ¯ve equations to identify
them. We never used equation (21) in our calculations above. Consequently, we can use this source of
overidenti¯cation to generate a test that can reject whether agents know the factors or not at the time the
sectoral choice is made, which we describe in detail in the next section.
Also, note that the covariance between Y0 and Y1 can be identi¯ed, because we know each of the
terms in the right-hand side of (16): Consequently, from a single cross-section on outcomes, choices and
a measurement equation, we can recover the joint distribution of Y0 and Y1 and use such knowledge to
answer counterfactual questions. We now show how access to panel data allows us to identify the model
even in the absence of a measurement.
The observation of outcomes for two di®erent periods The availability of a measurement M
guarantees identi¯cation by providing more information, i.e., more covariance equations which we can
14use to solve for the factor loadings and the parameters that characterize the distribution of the factor.
However, researchers may not observe candidate proxies that could be used as measurements, but they
may observe, for example, outcomes for more than one period. To ¯x ideas, suppose that we observe
earnings for at least two periods, Yt = (1 ¡ S)Y0;t + SY1;t and Yt+k = (1 ¡ S)Y0;t+k + SY1;t+k for some
k 6= 0: For ¿ = t;t + k; let
Y0;¿ = X¯0;¿ + µ®0;¿ + "0;¿
Y1;¿ = X¯1;¿ + µ®1;¿ + "1;¿:
We assume that "s;¿ are independently normally distributed random variables for s = 0;1 and ¿ = t;t+k:We
can allow X to vary over time as well, but this would only complicate the notation without adding any
insight to our discussion of identi¯cation, so we will abstract from time variation for X. Assuming that
the interest rate r is zero, so that there is no discounting, the utility index is de¯ned as
I = E (Y1;t+k + Y1;t ¡ Y0;t+k ¡ Y0;t ¡ CjI):
If we maintain the assumption that "s;¿ = 2 I for s = 0;1 and ¿ = t;t + k the net utility index I is de¯ned
as:
I = X (¯1;t+k + ¯1;t ¡ ¯0;t+k ¡ ¯0;t) ¡ Z° + (®1;t+k + ®1;t ¡ ®0;t+k ¡ ®0;t ¡ ®C)µ ¡ "C:
It is easy to show that mean observed earnings for periods ¿ = t;t + k can be expressed as9:




























9See the \Derivation Appendix" on the website for details. http://jenni.uchicago.edu/frame-ineq.
15Again, for each time period ¿ we can apply Heckman (1976) two-step procedure and obtain consistent
estimators of ¯s;¿ and ¼s;¿; s = 0;1; ¿ = t;t + k. Assume we normalize ®0;t = 1: If we compute the ratio
¼s;¿
¼0;t we can identify ®s;¿ for s = 0;1 and ¿ = t;t + k:We can identify the factor variance ¾2
µ from the
covariance:
Cov (Y1;t+k ¡ X¯1;t+k;Y1;t ¡ X¯1;t) = ®1;t®1;t+k¾
2
µ:
At this point, it remains to show identi¯cation of ®C and ¾2
"C: We have already discussed identi¯cation
of ¾2
"C and concluded that we can recover it as long as we have variables W that are part of the vector X
but not part of the vector Z: If this is not the case, then we must normalize ¾2
"C = 1: In either case, we
can then recover ®C from ¼0;t since:
¼0;t =
(®1;t+k + ®1;t ¡ ®0;t+k ¡ ®0;t ¡ ®C)¾2
µ




and the only unknown in this equation is ®C:
It is interesting to remark that the covariance across counterfactuals:
Cov (Y0;¿;Y1;¿0) = ®0;¿®1;¿0¾
2
µ
can be computed since all of the elements on the right-hand side have been determined. Note that again
we have one more equation than unknown, and we can use the overidenti¯cation to test whether µ 2 I or
not.
Multiple Measurements and Panel data on outcomes Some lucky researchers may observe
many measurements and may have the availability of panel data on outcomes. In this case, it is possible
to identify models with more than one factor. Consider, for example, the empirical analysis of Carneiro,
Hansen, and Heckman (2003). In their study, they have a two-sector model (high school and college labor).









M = 1: They model (log) earnings Ys;t as:
Ys;t = X¯s;t + µ1®s;t + µ2±s;t + "s;t:
They normalize ±1;1 = 1: Recall that one normalization is needed to set the scale of the factor. Let C
denote the costs of choosing college. They model costs C as:
C = Z° + µ1®C + µ2±C + "C:












Note that Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) estimate a two-factor model. Because the test scores
only depend on the ¯rst factor, they can use the test scores to identify the distribution of µ1: They use the
earnings and choice equations to identify the distribution of factor µ2: We increase the number of factors
that can be identi¯ed if the length of the panel increases, or if we have measurements associated with
other characteristics that a®ect both choices and earnings. For example, Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro
(2005) identify a model with three factors because they have a set of measurements and earnings for ¯ve
periods. For the general treatment about the limitation on the number of factors we refer the reader to
Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003). They also present an analysis of identi¯cation without imposing
distributional assumptions on the unobservables. Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2006) generalize their
analysis.
4 Distinguishing between Heterogeneity and Uncertainty
In the literature on earnings dynamics (e.g., Lillard and Willis, 1978), it is common to estimate an earnings
equation of the sort
yt = X¯ + ±S + vt; (23)
17where yt;X;S;vt denote, respectively, log earnings, observable characteristics (which may vary over time),
educational attainment and unobservable characteristics of person i at time t. Often the error term vt is
decomposed into two or more components. For example,
vt = Á + "t: (24)
The term Á is a person-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect. The error term "t is generally assumed to be serially correlated,
say "t = ½"t¡1 + ´t where ´t is an independently and identically distributed innovation with mean zero.
It is widely accepted that components of X;Á; and "t all contribute to measured inequality. However,
the literature is silent about the di®erence between heterogeneity and uncertainty, the unforecastable
part of earnings|what Jencks, Smith, Acland, Bane, Cohen, Gintis, Heyns, and Michelson (1972) call
\luck". On intuitive grounds, the predictable components of vt have a di®erent e®ect on welfare than
the unpredictable components, especially if people are risk averse and cannot fully insure against the
uncertainty. Is uncertainty Á? Is it "t? Is it Á + "t? Or ´t? Statistical decompositions such as (23) and
(24) tell us nothing about which components of (23) are unforecastable by agents.
The methodology summarized in this chapter, and developed more fully in Cunha, Heckman, and
Navarro (2005), provides a framework within which it is possible to identify and separate components that
are forecastable from ones that are not. The essential idea of their method can be illustrated in the case
of educational choice. In order to choose between high school and college, say at age 17, agents forecast
future earnings (and other returns) at each schooling level. Using this information from educational choice
at age 17, together with the realization of earnings that are observed at later ages, it is possible to estimate
and test which part of future earnings are forecast by the agent at age 17.
In this method, we use choice information to extract ex ante or forecast earnings to distinguish them
from ex post or realized earnings. The di®erence between forecast and realized earnings allows us to identify
the components of uncertainty facing agents at the time they make their schooling decisions. With this
method, we can distinguish predictable heterogeneity from uncertainty.
We formalize the argument by considering the two-factor, two-period earnings model of Carneiro,
Hansen, and Heckman (2003), Let I denote the information set of the agent at the time the schooling





(Y1;t ¡ Y0;t) ¡ C j I
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:
In this economy, the decision rule is quite simple: one attends school if the expected gains from schooling






[X (¯1;t ¡ ¯0;t) + µ1 (®1;t ¡ ®0;t) + µ2 (±1;t ¡ ±0;t) + "1;t ¡ "0;t] ¡ (Z° + µ1®C + µ2±C + "C)




The decision rule of agents is:
S = 1 if I ¸ 0; S = 0 otherwise.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that X;Z and µ1 are in the information set of the agent, and that the
interest rate is zero (r = 0). By assumption, the error terms "s;t for s;t = 0;1 are not in the information
set of the agent. We want to test whether µ2 is also in the information set of the agent at the time of the
schooling choice. If µ2 2 I, then it re°ects heterogeneity across agents (since agents know and act on it).
If µ2 = 2 I, then it re°ects either uncertainty or some information that agents know, but do not act on.
Suppose that our null hypothesis is µ1 2 I; but µ2 = 2 I. Under the null:
I = E (Y1;1 + Y1;2 ¡ Y0;1 ¡ Y0;2 ¡ CjI) = ¹I(X;Z) + ®Iµ1:
Consequently, we have that:
Cov (I ¡ ¹I(X;Z);Y1;1 ¡ X¯1;t)) = ®I®1;1¾
2
µ1
Let ¢µ2 be such that:





Then, we reject the null, and conclude that agents know and act on the information contained in factor 2,
19µ2; if we reject that ¢µ2 = 0:
The idea of our test is thus very simple. The components of future earnings that are forecastable are
captured by the factors that are known by the agents when they make their educational choices. The
predictable factors are estimated with a nonzero loading in the choice equation. The uncertainty in the
decision regarding college is captured by the factors that the agent does not act on when making the
decision of whether to attend college or not. In this case, the loadings (coe±cients on these factors) in
the choice equation would be zero. Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) provide exact conditions for
identifying the factor loadings.10 Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) develop this analysis further.
5 Empirical Results
We now apply these models to data. In this section we report estimates of a model of schooling choice,
show how one can recover the distribution of µ, ®C and ®s;t, s = 0;1, t = 0;:::;T, and put our analysis
to use to estimate counterfactual distributions for di®erent policies, to compute their consequences for
mobility and inequality and to measure the contributions of \luck" to post-schooling earnings. We answer
how much of the post-schooling earnings is predictable at the age schooling decisions are made.
5.1 The Data, Equations, and Estimation
In our empirical analysis, we use a sample of white males from the NLSY data. Following the preceding
theoretical analysis, we consider only two schooling choices: high school and college graduation. We
assume that credit markets are perfect. By this we mean that restrictions on borrowing against future
earnings are assumed not to be important. See Cameron and Taber (2004) and Carneiro and Heckman
(2002) for evidence supporting this assumption in the context of schooling choices.11 Carneiro, Hansen,
and Heckman (2003) assume the absence of credit markets and obtain empirical results on the extent of
uncertainty similar to the ones presented here, so the issue of whether credit markets function or not does
not a®ect the main conclusions of our analysis.
10Identi¯cation depends on the length of the panel, the number of measurement equations and the variation in Z and X:
11We note, however, that a large literature in macroeconomics based on separable preferences claims to ¯nd evidence of
substantial departures from complete contingent claims markets using consumption data. See e.g. the survey in Browning,
Hansen, and Heckman (1999).
20To economize on space, we place many tables on our website for this paper: http://jenni.uchicago.edu/frame-
ineq. Web table W1a presents the list of variables used in our empirical analysis. They show that college
graduates have higher present value of earnings than high school graduates. College graduates also have
higher test scores and come from better family backgrounds. They are more likely to live in a location
where a college is present, and where college tuition is lower.
To simplify the empirical analysis, we divide the lifetimes of individuals into two periods. The ¯rst
period covers ages 17 through 28 and the second goes from 29 through 65. We impute missing wages and
project earnings for the ages not observed in the NLSY data using the procedure described in Appendix
B of Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003). In Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005), we consider
alternative ways to create full life cycle histories. Combination of data sets is required since the NLSY
does not contain information on the full life cycle of earnings. We augment the NLSY data with data
from the PSID to estimate the lifetime earnings of the NLSY sample members. For each schooling level s,
s 2 f0;1g, for each period t 2 f1;2g we calculate the present value of earnings at age 17; Ys;t: We assume
that the error term for Ys;t is generated by a two factor model,
Ys;t = X¯s;t + µ1®s;t;1 + µ2®s;t;2 + "s;t: (25)
We omit the \i" subscripts to eliminate notational burden. This model is all that is required to ¯t our
data. Additional factors, when entered, do not contribute to the ¯t of the model. In web table W1b we
list the elements of X used in our empirical analysis. They are listed in the column \PV Earnings." We
normalize ®0;1;2 = 1.
For the measurement system for cognitive ability we use ¯ve components of the ASVAB test battery:
arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph composition, math knowledge and coding speed. We
link the ¯rst factor to this system of ability tests, and exclude the other factor from it. Thus, we adopt two
normalizations. First, the loading on the ¯rst factor on the arithmetic reasoning test is set to one. Second,
the loading on the second factor is set to zero in all test equations. Thus the test scores are devoted to
measuring ability. We include family background variables among the covariates XT in the ASVAB test
equations. Web table W1b lists the variables used in XT: They are listed in the column \Test System."
Formally, let Tj denote the test score j :
21Tj = XT!j + µ1®testj;1 + "testj: (26)
The cost function C is given by:
C = Z° + µ1®C;1 + µ2®C;2 + "C (27)
where the Z are variables that a®ect the costs of going to college and include variables that do not a®ect
outcomes Ys;t (such as local tuition, and distance to college). Web table W1b shows the full set of covariates
used in Z under the column \Cost Function."
For the educational choice equation, we assume that agents know X, Z, "C and some, but not necessarily














C j Z;X; ¹ µ;"C
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(28)
where future earnings are discounted at interest rate r = :03: Individuals go to college if V > 0: We test
and do not reject the hypothesis that individuals, at the time they make their college decisions, know their
cost functions, the factors ¹ µ; and unobservables in cost "C: However, they do not know "s;t; s 2 f0;1g,
t 2 f1;2g at the time they make their educational choices, and they may not know other components of
~ µ. The factor loadings on the µ not in ¹ µ are estimated to be zero in the choice equation. See Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro (2005) for further discussion of this test and for extensions of the method.





where Á(´ j ¹j;¿j) is a normal density for ´ with mean ¹j and variance ¿j: As shown in Ferguson (1983),
mixtures of normals with a large number of components approximate any distribution of µk arbitrarily
well.12 Even though the "s;t are nonparametrically identi¯ed, we assume in the empirical work reported
12In the `1 norm.
22here that they are normally distributed.13 We estimate the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
methods. In web tables W2a{W2c , available at our website, we present estimated coe±cients and factor
loadings for the model.
5.2 Results
We now present the empirical results for our model.
5.2.1 How the Model Fits the Data
To assess the validity of our estimates, we perform a variety of checks of ¯t of predictions against the
data. We ¯rst compare the proportions of people who choose each schooling level. In the NLSY data,
55% choose high school and 45% choose college. The model predicts 56% and 44%, respectively. The
model replicates the observed proportions, and formal tests of equality of predicted and actual proportions
cannot be rejected.
In web ¯gure W1 we show the densities of the predicted and actual present value of earnings for the
overall sample of high school and college graduates. The ¯t is also good. Web ¯gures W2 and W3, show
the same densities restricted to the sample of those who choose high school (W2) and college (W3). The
¯t is good. When we also perform formal tests of equality of predicted and actual distributions, we cannot
reject the hypothesis of equality of the distributions for each schooling choice using a chi-square goodness
of ¯t test at a 5% signi¯cance level for all 3 cases (Table 1). We conclude that a two factor model is
enough to ¯t the data. From this analysis, we conclude that earnings innovations "s;t relative to a two
factor model are not in the agents' information sets at the time they are making schooling decisions. If
they were, additional factors would be required to capture the full covariance between educational choices
and future earnings, but when we enter additional factors, they do not improve the ¯t of the model to
data and have zero estimated factor loadings in the choice equation.
13Models where the "s;t are allowed to be mixtures do not change the conclusions of this paper. However, they increase
the complexity of the simulation analysis. For this reason, we use the simple normal framework to estimate the uniquenesses.
We stress, however, that it is not a requirement, just a matter of convenience.
235.2.2 The Factors: Non-normality and Evidence on Selection
In order to ¯t the data, one must allow for non-normal factors, as one can see from the evidence summarized
in ¯gure 1. To generate ¯gure 1, we compute the variance of the distribution of factor 1, say ¾µ1. Since
the factors have mean zero, we can plot the estimated density of factor 1 against that of a normal random
variable with mean zero and variance ¾µ1: We proceed in a similar fashion for factor 2. Neither factor
is normally distributed. A traditional assumption used in factor analysis (see, e.g., JÄ oreskog, 1977) is
violated. Our approach is more general and does not require normality.
Web ¯gure W4 plots the density of factor 1 conditional on educational choices. Since factor 1 is
associated with cognitive tests, we can interpret it as an index of \ability". The agents who choose college
have, on average, higher ability. Selection on ability is important in explaining college attendance. A
similar analysis of factor 2 reveals that schooling decisions are not very much a®ected by it. However,
factor 2 is important for predicting future earnings, as we show below.
5.2.3 Estimating Joint Distributions of Counterfactuals: Returns, Costs and Ability as
Determinants of Schooling
In estimating the distribution of earnings in counterfactual schooling states within a policy regime (e.g.,
the distributions of college earnings for people who actually choose to be high school graduates), the
usual approach is to assume that both distributions are the same except for an additive constant | the
coe±cient of a schooling dummy in an earnings regression. More recently developed methods partially
relax this assumption by assuming preservation of ranks across potential outcome distributions, but do
not freely specify the two outcome distributions (see Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005; Heckman, Smith,
and Clements, 1997; Vytlacil, 2002). Our approach relaxes this assumption by allowing for arbitrary
dependence across potential outcome distributions. Table 2 presents the conditional distribution of ex
post potential college earnings given ex post potential high school earnings decile by decile. The table
displays a strong positive dependence between the relative positions of individuals in the two distributions.
In particular, for all high school deciles more than 50% of the individuals located at any decile in the
high school earnings distribution will be within one decile of their original position in the college earnings
distribution. However, the dependence is far from perfect. For example, almost 10% of those who are at
24the sixth decile of the high school distribution would be in the eighth decile of the college distribution.
Observe that this comparison is not being made in terms of positions in the overall distribution of earnings.
We can determine where individuals are located in the distribution of population potential high school
earnings and the distribution of potential college earnings although in the data we only observe them in
either one or the other state. The assumption of perfect dependence across components of counterfactual
distributions that is maintained in much of the recent literature (e.g., Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993) is,
however, too strong, at least in this application.
Figures 2 and 3 present the marginal densities of predicted and counterfactual earnings for college
(¯gure 2) and high school participants (¯gure 3). When we compare the densities of the present value of
earnings in the college sector for persons who choose college against the counterfactual densities of high
school earnings for college graduates, the density of the present value of earnings for college graduates is
to the right of the counterfactual density of the present value of earnings of college graduates if they were
high school graduates. Figure 4 reveals that college graduate earnings are higher for high school graduates
than high school earnings. The surprising feature of both ¯gures is that the overlap of the distributions is
substantial. Many high school graduates would have large earnings as college graduates.
Figure 4 plots the density of returns to education for agents who are high school graduates (the solid
curve), and the density of returns to education for agents who are college graduates (the dashed curve).
College graduates have returns distributed somewhat \to the right" of high school graduates, so the
di®erence is not only a di®erence for the mean individual but is actually present over the entire distribution.
An economic interpretation of ¯gure 4 is that agents who choose a college education are the ones who tend
to gain more from it.
Web table W3 reports the ¯tted and counterfactual present value of earnings for agents who choose
high school. The typical high school student would earn $703.78 thousand dollars over the life cycle. She
would earn $1,021.97 thousand if she had chosen to be a college graduate.14 This implies a return of
46% to a college education over the whole life cycle (i.e., a monetary gain of 318.19 thousand dollars).
In web table W4, we note that the typical college graduate earns $1,122.69 thousand dollars (above the
counterfactual earnings of what a typical high school student would earn in college), and would make only
$756.13 thousand dollars over her lifetime if she chose to be a high school graduate instead. The returns to
14These numbers may appear to be large but are a consequence of using a 3% discount rate.
25college education for the typical college graduate (which in the literature on program evaluation is referred
to as the e®ect of Treatment on the Treated) is 50% above that of the return for a high school graduate. In
monetary terms we would say that a college graduate has a gain of going to college almost 50,000 dollars
higher over her lifetime than does the typical high school graduate.
With our methodology we can also determine returns to the marginal student. Web table W5 reveals
that the average individual who is just indi®erent between a college education and a high school diploma
earns $743.40 thousand dollars as a high school graduate or $1,089.97 thousand dollars as a college graduate.
This implies a return of 48%. The returns to people at the margin are above those of the typical high
school graduate, but below those for the typical college graduate. Since persons at the margin are more
likely to be a®ected by a policy that encourages college attendance, their returns are the ones that should
be used in order to compute the marginal bene¯t of policies that induce people into schooling.
A major question that emerges from our analysis is, why, if high school graduates have positive returns
to attending college, don't all people attend? People do not pick schooling levels based only on monetary
returns. Recall that their choice criterion (equation (28)) includes also the pecuniary and non-pecuniary
costs of actually attending college. Figure 5 shows the estimated density of the monetary value of this cost
both overall and by schooling level. While almost no high school graduate perceives a negative cost (i.e.,
a bene¯t) of attending college; around one third of college graduates actually perceive it as a bene¯t. Web
table W6 explores this point in more detail by presenting the mean total cost of attending college and the
mean cost that is due to ability. Costs on average are smaller for college graduates. College graduates
have higher ability. The average contribution of ability to costs is positive for high school graduates (a
true cost). It is negative for college graduates, so it is perceived as a bene¯t. This is the answer to our
puzzle: people do not only (or even mainly) make their schooling decisions by looking at their monetary
returns in terms of earnings. Psychic costs play a very important role. Di®erences in ability are one force
behind this result.15;16
15Furthermore, we know that this result is not sensitive to the speci¯cation of the credit market. Carneiro, Hansen, and
Heckman (2003) obtain a similar conclusion in a model where people are not allowed to borrow or lend. In our model, on
the other hand, there are no constraints to borrowing or lending. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) present additional
evidence on this issue.
16\Psychic costs" can stand in for expectational errors and attitudes towards risk. We do not distinguish among these
explanations in this paper. The estimated costs are too large to be due to tuition alone. As noted below, given that returns
are strongly forecastable, important role for expectational errors seems unlikely. See the discussion in Cunha, Heckman, and
Navarro (2005).
265.2.4 Mobility and Heterogeneity versus Uncertainty
In ¯gures 6 through 8 we separate the e®ect of heterogeneity from uncertainty in earnings. The information
set of the agent is I = fX;Z;XT;"C;£g where £ contains some or all of the factors. Focusing on ¯gure 6
we start by assuming that the agents do not know their factors; consequently, £ = ?: If we let the agent
learn about factor 1,17 so that, £ = fµ1g; then the reduction in the forecast variance is basically nil. This
exercise shows that while factor 1 is important for forecasting educational choices, it does not do a very
good job in forecasting earnings. Now, assume that the agent is given knowledge of factor 2, but not factor
1, so that £ = fµ2g. Then the agent is able to substantially reduce the forecast variance of earnings in
high school. Thus, while factor 2 does not greatly a®ect college choices, it greatly informs the agent about
his future earnings. When the agent is given knowledge of both factors 1 and 2, that is, £ = fµ1;µ2g;
he can forecast earnings marginally better. Factor 1 provides information on ability, but almost none on
future earnings. Figure 7 reveals much the same story about college earnings.
Table 3 presents the variance of potential earnings in each state, and returns under di®erent information
sets available to the agent. We conduct this exercise for the forecast of period 1, period 2, and lifetime
earnings. We report baseline variances and covariances without conditioning and the remaining uncertainty
state as a fraction of the baseline no information state when di®erent components are given to the agents.
Note that knowledge of factor 2 is fundamentally important in reducing forecast variance for period 2
earnings.
This discussion sheds light on the issue of distinguishing predictable heterogeneity from uncertainty.
We have demonstrated that there is a large dispersion in the distribution of the present value of earnings.
This dispersion is largely due to heterogeneity, which is forecastable by the agents at the time they are
making their schooling choices. Recall that by our tests agents know µ1 and µ2. The remaining dispersion
is due to luck, or uncertainty or unforecastable factors as of age 17. Its contribution is smaller.
It is interesting to note that knowledge of the factors enables agents to make better forecasts. Figure 8
presents an exercise for returns to college (Y1 ¡ Y0) similar to that presented in ¯gures 6 and 7 regarding
information sets available to the agent. Knowledge of factor 2 also greatly improves the forecastability of
returns, 80% of the variability in returns is forecastable at age 17. The levels are even more predictable
17As opposed to the econometrician who never gets to observe either µ1 or µ2.
27(94% for high school; 97% for college). Most variability across people is due to heterogeneity and not
uncertainty18.
5.2.5 Ex Ante versus Ex Post
Once the distinction between heterogeneity and uncertainty is made, we can talk about the distinction
between ex ante and ex post decision making. From our analysis, we conclude that, at the time agents
pick their schooling, the "'s in their earnings equations are unknown to them. These are the components
that correspond to luck as de¯ned by Jencks, Smith, Acland, Bane, Cohen, Gintis, Heyns, and Michelson
(1972). It is clear that decision making would be di®erent, at least for some individuals, if the agent knew
these chance components when choosing schooling levels since decision rule (1){(2) would now be






¡ C > 0
S = 1 if V > 0; S = 0 otherwise,
where no expectation is taken to calculate V since all terms on the right hand side of the top equation are
known with certainty by the agent.
In our empirical model, if individuals could pick their schooling level using their ex post information
(i.e., after learning their luck components in earnings) 13:81% of high school graduates would rather be
college graduates and 17:15% of college graduates would have stopped their schooling at the high school
level.
5.2.6 Analyzing a Cohort Speci¯c Cross-Subsidized Tuition Policy: Constructing Joint Dis-
tributions of Counterfactuals Across Policy Regimes
As an example of the power of our method to evaluate the consequences of policy on income inequality, we
analyze a cross-subsidized tuition policy indexed by family income level. We construct joint distributions
of outcomes within policy regimes (treatment and no treatment or schooling and no schooling) and joint
18The high predictability of future earnings and returns may be in°ated by our imputation procedure. In recent unpublished
work Cunha and Heckman (2006) using pooled data and avoiding imputation show that we get even higher predictability
for returns to college (i.e., only 14.11% of the variance of unobservable in returns are uncertain to the agent), but higher
uncertainty for levels (19% for college and 32% for high school).
28distributions of choices (Y = SY1 + (1 ¡ S)Y0) across policy regimes. The policy analyzed is as follows. A
prospective student whose family income at age 17 is below the mean is allowed to attend college free of
charge. The policy is self ¯nancing within each schooling cohort. To pay for this policy, persons attending
college with family income above the mean pay a tuition charge equal to the amount required to cover the
costs of the students from lower income families as well as their own.
Total tuition raised covers the cost K of educating each student. Thus if there are NP poor students
and NR rich students, total costs are (NP + NR)K. In the proposed policy, the poor pay nothing. So






. To determine T, notice that NP = NP(T);
NR = NR(T). We iterate to ¯nd the unique self ¯nancing T: Notice that NP (T), the number of poor
people who attend college when tuition is zero, is the same for all values of T (NP (T) = NP (0) for all T).
NR is sensitive to the tuition level charged.
Figure 9 shows that the marginal distributions of income in both the prepolicy state and the postpolicy
state are essentially identical. Under the anonymity postulate we would judge these two situations as
equally good using Lorenz measures or second order stochastic dominance. We move beyond anonymity
and analyze the e®ect that the policy has on what Fields (2003) calls \positional" mobility.
Panel 1 of table 4 presents this analysis by describing how the 9.3% of the people who are a®ected by the
policy move between deciles of the distribution of income. These statistics describe movements from one
income distribution in the initial regime to another income distribution associated with the new regime.
The policy a®ects more people at the top deciles than at the lower deciles. Around half of the people
a®ected who start at the ¯rst decile remain at the ¯rst decile. People in the middle deciles are spread
both up and down and a large proportion of people in the upper deciles is moved into a lower position
(only sixteen percent of those starting on the top decile remain there after the policy is implemented).
Moving beyond the anonymity postulate (which instructs us to examine only marginal distributions), we
learn much more about the e®ects of the policy on di®erent groups.
Thus far, we have focused on constructing and interpreting the joint distribution of outcomes across
the two policy regimes. If outcomes under both regimes are observed, these comparisons can be made
using panel data. No use of counterfactuals is necessary. However, our methods will apply if either or both
policy regimes are unobserved but are proposed. Taking advantage of the fact that we can identify not only
joint distributions of earnings over policy regimes but also over counterfactual states within regimes we
29can learn a great deal more about the e®ects of this policy, whether or not policy regimes are observed.19
Table 5 and panels 2 and 3 of table 4 reveal that not only 9.3% of the population is a®ected by the policy
but that actually about half of them moved from high school into college (4.5% of the population) and half
moved from college into high school (4.8% percent of the population). This translates into saying that, of
those a®ected by the policy, 92% of the high school graduates stay in high school in the post-policy regime
while only 89% of college graduates stay put. Thus the policy is slightly biased against college attendance.
We can form the joint distributions of lifetime earnings by initial schooling level. Figure 10 summarizes
some of the evidence presented in table 5. The panels 2 and 3 of table 4 show that the policy a®ects very
few high school graduates at the top end of the income distribution (only 1.7% of those a®ected come from
the 10th percentile) and a lot of college graduates in the same situation (19% of college graduates a®ected
come from the top decile). We can also see that the policy tends to move high school graduates up in
the income distribution and moves college graduates down. As another example of the generality of our
method and the new insight into income mobility induced by policy that it provides, we can determine
where people come from and where they end up at in the counterfactual distributions of earnings. Table
6 shows where in the prepolicy distribution of high school earnings persons induced to go to college come
from and where in the postpolicy distribution of college earnings they go to. Most people stay in their
decile or move closely to adjacent ones. Given that some people bene¯t from the policy while others lose, it
is not clear whether society as a whole values this policy positively or not. An advantage of our method is
that it allows us to calculate the e®ect that the policy has on welfare. An individual's relative utility is not
only given by earnings but also by the monetary value of psychic costs. We can predict how people would
vote if the policy analyzed in this section were proposed. Table 7 shows the result of such an exercise. The
policy lowers the mean earnings for people a®ected by it. Most people not indi®erent to the policy would
vote against it.
5.2.7 Robustness
In this section we discuss the robustness of the results with respect to many of the empirical and modelling
assumptions in our work. Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) assume that markets are incomplete.
19It is implausible that we would have panel data on policy regimes where under one regime a person goes to school and
under another he does not.
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they ¯nd that the agents at the top percentile of the distribution of high school earnings are more likely
to change their schooling status under a tuition reduction policy. What drives the result is the estimated
positive correlation between college and high school earnings. A reduction in cost tends to generate greater
gains for those individuals who have large income in the high school sector.
Cunha and Heckman (2006) show that the aggregation of earnings into a few periods tends to over-
estimate the share of total variance that is known by individuals. They aggregate earnings in 16 and 24
periods and ¯nd that earnings predictability is around 60% for college and high school graduates, and
around 55% for returns. Cunha and Heckman (2006) also test the 3% discount rate that is used to cal-
culate the present value of earnings. They consider di®erent values (2%,4%, and 5%). They show that as
discount rates increase, there is more predictability in lifetime earnings. Consequently, temporary shocks
tend to vanish as we aggregate earnings in fewer periods and use a higher discount rate to calculate present
value of earnings. However, the estimated correlation between college and high school earnings is always
positive regardless of the aggregation of life cycle earnings strategy we use or the discount rate we adopt to
calculate present value of earnings. Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) present a comprehensive survey
of the literature.
6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper summarizes and applies a new body of research on counterfactual analyses of income inequality
and mobility. We construct counterfactuals within policy regimes and counterfactuals across policy regimes.
Using the methods presented here, it is possible to understand the sources of inequality, and the inequality
and mobility consequences of social policies much more deeply than is possible using traditional measures
based on the anonymity axiom.
We show how to construct distributions of counterfactuals within policy regimes using factor models.
With these same tools, we show how to separate variability into two components: (a) those that are
predictable by a certain age (heterogeneity) and (b) those that are not (luck).
We apply these methods to analyze the returns to college education. We ¯nd that by age 17, when
college decisions are made, prospective students can forecast roughly 80% of the lifetime variance in
31their returns to schooling. Heterogeneity and not uncertainty drives the variance in earnings both cross-
sectionally and over time. Given the relatively small role for uncertainty, it is unlikely that expectational
errors about future earnings play a major role in explaining college choices.
We also ¯nd that counterfactual outcomes both within and across policy regimes are highly correlated.
However there is a lot of slippage in ranks across potential outcomes within one policy regime and the
outcomes chosen across policy regimes. Ranks are by no means identical across these counterfactual
distributions. One justi¯cation for the use of the anonymity postulate in the analysis of data on income
distributions is that outcomes are independent across policies. That justi¯cation is strongly rejected in
our data, as is the polar assumption that ranks are perfectly dependent across policies.
We show how our methods can reveal where in initial and ¯nal distributions persons induced to change
their education by a tuition subsidy policy will come from, and where they end up. Such analyses can be
made both in terms of initial and ¯nal outcome distributions and in distributions of potential outcomes
associated with each educational choice. We present a much richer analysis of the inequality and mo-
bility consequences of policies than are available from analyses based on panel data or data from social
experiments.
This paper has ignored the analysis of general equilibrium e®ects operating through factor markets even
though such e®ects are empirically important for large scale programs. Substantial changes in educational
enrollments will a®ect the wages of college and high school students. The next step in our research program
is to graft the methods in this paper to the general equilibrium framework of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber
(1998a,b,c, 1999) to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the e®ects of policies on inequality.
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36Table 1 
Goodness of Fit Test for Lifetime Earnings 
  χ
2 Statistic  Critical Value* 
Overall 48.9251  53.1419 
High School  25.4820  26.0566 
College 32.2506  33.2562 
*95% confidence, equiprobable bins with approximately 23 people per bin  
Table 2
Ex-post Conditional Distribution (College Earnings Conditional on High School Earnings)  




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
1  0.6980 0.2534 0.0444 0.0032 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2  0.2270 0.4150 0.2470 0.0890 0.0180 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
3  0.0450 0.2160 0.3420 0.2610 0.1070 0.0260 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4  0.0140 0.0950 0.2120 0.2930 0.2390 0.1090 0.0370 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 
5  0.0000 0.0300 0.1130 0.2190 0.2940 0.2170 0.1100 0.0170 0.0000 0.0000 
6  0.0000 0.0040 0.0340 0.0980 0.2030 0.3080 0.2470 0.0990 0.0070 0.0000 
7  0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0340 0.1130 0.2390 0.3190 0.2350 0.0500 0.0000 
8  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0240 0.0910 0.2360 0.4010 0.2320 0.0130 
9  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0060 0.0470 0.2360 0.5400 0.1700 
10  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0110 0.1710 0.8170 
*di is the ith decile of the College Lifetime Earnings Distribution and dj is the jth decile of the High School Lifetime 
Earnings Distribution. 
 Table 3 
Agent’s Forecast Variance of Present Value of Earnings 
Under Different Information Sets: I = { X,Z,XT ,εC ,Θ } 
(as a fraction of the variance when no information is available) 
 Var(Yc) Var(Yh) Var(Yc - Yh) Cov(Yc  , Yh) 
For time period 1:
+        
Variance when Θ = ￿  7167.20 5090.46  3073.94  4591.86 
Percentage of variance remaining after 
controlling for the indicated factor: 
      
Θ = {θ1}  97.50% 98.34%  99.43%  97.33% 
Θ = {θ2}  18.50% 32.83%  89.52%  2.67% 
Θ = {θ1,θ2}  16.01% 31.17%  88.94%  0.00% 
        
For time period 2:
++        
Variance when Θ = ￿  49690.64 167786.87  41137.80  88169.85 
Percentage of variance remaining after 
controlling for the indicated factor: 
      
Θ = {θ1}  97.18% 97.54%  98.25%  97.28% 
Θ = {θ2}  7.39% 4.73%  16.55%  2.72% 
Θ = {θ1,θ2}  4.57% 2.27%  14.80%  0.00% 
        
For lifetime:
+++        
Variance when Θ = ￿  56857.84 172877.33  44211.74  92761.72 
Percentage of variance remaining after 
controlling for the indicated factor: 
      
Θ = {θ1}  97.22% 97.57%  98.33%  97.28% 
Θ = {θ2}  8.79% 5.56%  21.62%  2.72% 
Θ = {θ1,θ2}  6.01% 3.13%  19.95%  0.00% 
We use an interest rate of 3% to calculate the present value of earnings. In all cases, the information set of the agent is  
I = { X,Z,XT,εC ,Θ } and we change the contents of Θ. 
+Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings between age 17 and 28 as predicted at age 17. 
++Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings between age 29 and 65 as predicted at age 17. 
+++Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings between age 17 and 65 as predicted at age 17. 
So we would say that the variance of the unpredictable component of period 1 college earnings when using factor 1 in the prediction is 
97.5% of the variance when no information is available (i.e., 0.975*7167.2). 
 Table 4
Mobility of People Affected by Cross Subsidizing Tuition 
Overall: Fraction of Total Population who Switch Schooling Levels: 0.0932 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
0.0728  1  0.5565 0.2011 0.1220 0.0634 0.0283 0.0074 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0867  2  0.2079 0.1712 0.1715 0.1690 0.1585 0.0870 0.0322 0.0025 0.0002 0.0000 
0.0955  3  0.1148 0.1489 0.0935 0.1137 0.1573 0.1888 0.1387 0.0409 0.0034 0.0000 
0.0998  4  0.0619 0.1557 0.0910 0.0534 0.0764 0.1615 0.2084 0.1557 0.0360 0.0000 
0.1032  5  0.0296 0.1495 0.1387 0.0630 0.0304 0.0571 0.1411 0.2456 0.1396 0.0055 
0.1050  6  0.0066 0.0959 0.1726 0.1471 0.0520 0.0142 0.0415 0.1671 0.2605 0.0425 
0.1084  7  0.0006 0.0336 0.1411 0.1956 0.1269 0.0420 0.0082 0.0348 0.2346 0.1827 
0.1089  8  0.0000 0.0046 0.0519 0.1765 0.2211 0.1495 0.0388 0.0034 0.0513 0.3029 
0.1101  9  0.0000 0.0000 0.0055 0.0421 0.1570 0.2733 0.2302 0.0447 0.0014 0.2459 
0.1069  10  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0041 0.0517 0.2082 0.3242 0.2490 0.1626 
              
High school: Fraction of Total Population who Switch from High School to College due to the policy: 0.0450 
0.1012  1  0.3954 0.2557 0.1775 0.0936 0.0417 0.0110 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1279  2  0.0382 0.1220 0.2176 0.2325 0.2200 0.1210 0.0448 0.0035 0.0003 0.0000 
0.1369  3  0.0023 0.0188 0.0692 0.1536 0.2244 0.2701 0.1984 0.0584 0.0049 0.0000 
0.1367  4  0.0000 0.0016 0.0088 0.0368 0.1116 0.2417 0.3123 0.2332 0.0540 0.0000 
0.1285  5  0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0052 0.0277 0.0903 0.2324 0.4047 0.2300 0.0090 
0.1122  6  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0024 0.0151 0.0792 0.3209 0.5004 0.0816 
0.1017  7  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0101 0.0761 0.5133 0.3997 
0.0797  8  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0067 0.1440 0.8493 
0.0557  9  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0032 0.9968 
0.0173  10  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
College: Fraction of Total Population who Switch from College to High School due to the policy: 0.0473 
0.0459  1  0.8941 0.0866 0.0055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0475  2  0.6423 0.2972 0.0534 0.0062 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0560  3  0.3763 0.4510 0.1501 0.0211 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0647  4  0.1860 0.4648 0.2559 0.0868 0.0059 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0791  5  0.0753 0.3801 0.3518 0.1522 0.0347 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0982  6  0.0138 0.2001 0.3602 0.3064 0.1059 0.0133 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1148  7  0.0011 0.0618 0.2598 0.3603 0.2337 0.0766 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1366  8  0.0000 0.0071 0.0807 0.2744 0.3436 0.2323 0.0603 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1618  9  0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0559 0.2084 0.3628 0.3056 0.0593 0.0008 0.0000 
0.1920  10  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0044 0.0561 0.2260 0.3519 0.2702 0.0911 
Note: Cross subsidy consists in making tuition zero for people with family income below average and making the budget 
balance by raising tuition for college students with family income above the average. For example, we read from the first 
panel row 1, column 1 that 7.28% of the people who switch schooling levels come from the lowest decile. Out of those, 
55% are still in the first decile after the policy while 2.83% jump to the fifth decile. Panel 2 has the same interpretation but 
it only looks at people who switch from high school to college while panel 3 looks at individuals who switch from college 
to high school. 
 
 Table 5
Mobility of people affected by cross subsidizing tuition 
Fraction of the total population who switch schooling levels: 0.0932 
Pre-policy Choice:  Fraction of High School Graduates: 
  Do not switch  Become College graduates 
High School   0.9197  0.0803 
  Fraction of College Graduates: 
  Do not switch  Become High School graduates 
College 0.8923  0.1077 
    
Note: Cross subsidy consists in making tuition zero for people with family income below average and making the budget balance by 
raising tuition for college students with family income above the average. 
 
 Table 6
Mobility of People Affected by Cross Subsidizing Tuition Across Counterfactual Distributions 
Highschool: Fraction of Total Population who from High School to College after the policy: 0.0450 
Fraction by 
Decile of 












Probability of Moving to a Different Decile of the Post Policy College Lifetime Earnings 
Distribution 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
0.0667  1  0.8266 0.1227 0.0140 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0811  2  0.4044 0.4110 0.1490 0.0296 0.0055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0908  3  0.1488 0.3544 0.3059 0.1419 0.0445 0.0039 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0998  4  0.0401 0.2343 0.3096 0.2490 0.1234 0.0379 0.0053 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1047  5  0.0089 0.0713 0.2081 0.3053 0.2348 0.1282 0.0365 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1058  6  0.0004 0.0202 0.0950 0.2155 0.2761 0.2416 0.1273 0.0239 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1062  7  0.0000 0.0033 0.0243 0.0896 0.1888 0.3026 0.2662 0.1155 0.0096 0.0000 
0.1116  8  0.0000 0.0004 0.0016 0.0159 0.0630 0.1690 0.3220 0.3228 0.1024 0.0028 
0.1138  9  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0043 0.0293 0.1227 0.3271 0.4568 0.0582 
0.1173  10  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.0333 0.2626 0.7014 
College: Fraction of Total Population who Switch from College to High School due to the policy: 0.0473 
0.1095  1  0.5473 0.2945 0.1135 0.0316 0.0062 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1056  2  0.1076 0.3257 0.2937 0.1789 0.0716 0.0204 0.0016 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1035  3  0.0180 0.1473 0.2776 0.2657 0.1833 0.0857 0.0200 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1013  4  0.0004 0.0355 0.1535 0.2349 0.2866 0.1890 0.0847 0.0150 0.0004 0.0000 
0.1012  5  0.0000 0.0050 0.0467 0.1503 0.2654 0.2705 0.1903 0.0668 0.0050 0.0000 
0.0979  6  0.0000 0.0000 0.0091 0.0513 0.1678 0.2683 0.2972 0.1786 0.0276 0.0000 
0.0977  7  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0087 0.0463 0.1609 0.3071 0.3387 0.1362 0.0022 
0.0953  8  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0044 0.0430 0.1560 0.4020 0.3617 0.0324 
0.0964  9  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0127 0.1337 0.5355 0.3173 
0.0882  10  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0034 0.0915 0.9051 
Note: Cross subsidy consists in making tuition zero for people with family income below average and making the budget 
balance by raising tuition for college students with family income above the average. For example, we read from the first 
panel row 1, column 1 that 6.67% of the people who switch from high school to college come from the lowest decile of the 
prepolicy high school distribution. Out of those, 82.66% are still in the first decile of the post policy college earnings 
distribution after the policy is implemented while 1.40% "jump" to the third decile. Panel 2 has the same interpretation but it 
only looks at people who switch from college to high school. 
 
 Table 7 
Voting outcome of proposing cross subsidizing* tuition 
Fraction of the total population who switch schooling levels: 0.0932 
Average pre-policy lifetime earnings**  920.55 
Average post-policy lifetime earnings**  905.96 




*Cross subsidy consists in making tuition zero for people with family income below  
average and making the budget balance by raising tuition for college students with  
family income above the average. 
** In thousands of dollars. 









Figure 1                                      
Densities of factors and their normal equivalents
factor
Factor  1
Normal version of factor 1
Factor  2
Normal version of factor 2
Let f(q1) denote the density function of factor q1. 
We assume that  f( q1) is a mixture of normals. Assume m1 = E( q1), s1 = Var( q1).
Let f (m1,s1) denote the density of a normal random variable with mean m1 and variance s1.
The solid curve is the estimated density of factor q1, f( q1), while the dashed curve is the 
density of a normal random variable with mean and variance of factor q1,   f (m1,s1).
We proceed similarly for factor 2, where the fitted density is plotted with dots and dashes













Densities of present value of earnings




Let Y1 denote present value of earnings (discounted at a 3% interest rate) in the 
college sector. Let f(y1) denote its density function. The dashed line plots the fitted
Y1 density conditioned on choosing college, that is, f(y1 | S = 1),  while the solid line
shows the estimated counterfactual density function of Y1 for those agents who are 











Densities of present value of earnings




Let Y0 denote present value of earnings (discounted at a 3% interest rate) in the 
high school sector. Let f(y0) denote its density function. The solid curve plots the
fitted Y0 density conditioned on choosing high school, that is, f(y0 | S = 0), while the 
dashed line shows the counterfactual density function of Y0 for those agents who are 








Densities of ex post returns to college by schooling level chosen
fraction of the base state
HS
Col
Let Y0, Y1 denote the present value of earnings in high school and college sectors,
respectively. Define ex post returns to college as the ratio R = (Y1 - Y0)/Y0. Let f(r)
denote the density function of the random variable R. The solid line is the density
of ex post returns to college for high school graduates, that is, f(r | S=0). The dashed







Density of monetary value of psychic cost






In this figure we plot the monetary value of psychic costs. Let C denote the
monetary value of psychic costs.
The monetary value of psychic costs is given by:
C = ZL+ S1JC1 + S2JC2 +P C
The contribution of ability to the costs of attending college, in monetary value is










Densities of agent's forecast of the present value of high school earnings





Θ = {θ1, θ2}****
Let Y0 denote the agent's forecast of present value of earnings in the high school
sector . These are formed over the whole population, not just the subpopulation 
who go to high school.  We assume that agents know all coefficients.  Let I = { X,Z,XT,εC ,Θ}
denote the agents information set. Let f(y0 |I)denote the density of the agent's forecast of
present value of earnings in high school conditioned on the information set I. Then:
*Plot of f(y0 |I )under no element of θ in the information set, i.e., Θ = Ø.
** Plot of f(y0 |I )when only factor 1 is in the information set, i.e., Θ= {θ1}.
*** Plot of f(y0|I )when only factor 2 is in the information set, i.e., Θ = {θ2}.
















Θ = {θ1, θ2}****
under different information sets: I = { X,Z,XT,εC ,Θ }
Let Y1 denote the agent's forecast of present value of earnings in the college
sector . These are formed over the whole population, not just the subpopulation 
who go to college.  We assume that agents know all coefficients.  Let I = { X,Z,XT,εC ,Θ}
denote the agents information set. Let f(y1 |I)denote the density of the agent's forecast of
present value of earnings in college conditioned on the information set I. Then:
*Plot of f(y1 |I )under no element of θ in the information set, i.e., Θ = Ø.
** Plot of f(y1 |I )when only factor 1 is in the information set, i.e.,Θ = {θ1}.
*** Plot of f(y1|I )when only factor 2 is in the information set, i.e.,Θ = {θ2}.










Densities of agent's forecast gains in present value of earnings
(Y1 -Y0)




Θ = {θ1, θ2}****
Let Y0, Y1denote the agent's forecast of present value of earnings in the high school
and college sectors, respectively. We define the difference in present value of earnings as 
∆ = Y1-Y0. We assume that agents know all coefficients. Let I = {X,Z,XT,εC ,Θ},f(∆ |I)
denote the agents information set and the density of the agent's forecast of gains in 
present value of earnings in choosing college conditioned on the information set I,
respectively. These are defined over the entire population, then:
*Plot of f(∆ |I )under no element of θ in the information set, i.e., Θ = Ø.
** Plot of f(∆ |I ) when only factor 1 is in the information set, i.e., Θ = {θ1}.
*** Plot of f(∆ |I )when only factor 2 is in the information set, i.e., Θ = {θ2}.
**** Plot of f(∆ |I )when both factors are in the information set, i.e.,Θ = {θ1,θ2}.









Densities of present value of lifetime earnings      




Let YA,YB denote the observed present value of earnings pre and post policy, respectively. Define
f(yA), g(yB) as the marginal densities of present value of earnings pre and post policy. In this figure
we plot f(yA), g(yB). Figure 10
Fraction of people who switch schooling levels when tuition is cross subsidized










High school to College
College to High School
*Cross subsidy consists in making tuition zero for people with family income below average and making the budget balance by raising tuition for college 
students with family income above the average.  